Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment
Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment
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DOI：
10.1088/1367-2630/16/8/083016
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发表时间：
2014-08-07
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Perc, Matjaz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chen, Xiaojie;Szolnoki, Attila;Perc, Matjaz
拒绝参与制裁叛逃者的合作者造成了二阶搭便车问题。这样的合作者不会受到惩罚，因为他们为公共利益做出了贡献，但他们也避免了惩罚叛逃者的相关成本。利他主义的惩罚者那些合作和惩罚的人处于不利地位，令人困惑的是这种行为是如何进化的。我们表明，共同承担制裁叛逃者的责任，而不是依靠某些人永久地这样做，可以解决代价高昂的惩罚问题。受人类对公平竞争有强烈但也有情感倾向这一事实的启发，我们认为概率制裁是分配责任的最简单方式。在良好的混合人口的公共产品的游戏被转化为一个协调游戏，充分合作和背叛的两个稳定的均衡，而在结构化的人口模式的形成支持额外的反直觉的解决方案，让人想起Parrondo的悖论。
Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers-those that cooperate and punish-are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well-mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondo's paradox.