Action bias among elite soccer goalkeepers: The case of penalty kicks
Action bias among elite soccer goalkeepers: The case of penalty kicks
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DOI：
10.1016/j.joep.2006.12.001
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发表时间：
2007-10-01
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
Schein, Galit
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bar-Eli, Michael;Azar, Ofer H.;Schein, Galit
在足球点球大战中，守门员在看不清踢的方向之前就选择了动作。对世界顶级联赛和锦标赛中286个点球的分析表明，给定踢球方向的概率分布，守门员的最佳策略是留在球门中心。然而，守门员几乎总是向右或向左跳。我们对这种行为提出以下解释：因为规范是跳跃的，规范理论（Kahneman，D.，&米勒，D. T.（1986年）。规范理论：将现实与其替代品进行比较Psychological Review，93，136-153）暗示，进球后守门员在不作为（呆在中间）比在动作（跳跃）后感觉更糟，导致对动作的偏见。忽略偏见，一种倾向于不作为的偏见，在这里被颠倒了，因为这里的规范被颠倒了--采取行动而不是选择不作为。跳跃是一种常态的说法得到了第二项研究的支持，这项研究对32名顶级职业守门员进行了调查。这种看似有偏见的决策尤其引人注目，因为守门员有巨大的动机做出正确的决定，这是他们经常遇到的决定。最后，我们讨论了经济学和管理的作为/不作为偏见的几个影响。(c)2006 Elsevier B. V.保留所有权利。
in soccer penalty kicks, goalkeepers choose their action before they can clearly observe the kick direction. An analysis of 286 penalty kicks in top leagues and championships worldwide shows that given the probability distribution of kick direction, the optimal strategy for goalkeepers is to stay in the goal's center. Goalkeepers, however, almost always jump right or left. We propose the following explanation for this behavior: because the norm is to jump, norm theory (Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986). Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives. Psychological Review, 93, 136-153) implies that a goal scored yields worse feelings for the goalkeeper following inaction (staying in the center) than following action (jumping), leading to a bias for action. The omission bias, a bias in favor of inaction, is reversed here because the norm here is reversed - to act rather than to choose inaction. The claim that jumping is the norm is supported by a second study, a survey conducted with 32 top professional goalkeepers. The seemingly biased decision making is particularly striking since the goalkeepers have huge incentives to make correct decisions, and it is a decision they encounter frequently. Finally, we discuss several implications of the action/omission bias for economics and management. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.