Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
Unique Implementation of Incentive Contracts with Many Agents
复制标题
与众多代理商签订激励合同的独特实施方式
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1988
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Ma
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Ma
在本文中，我们考虑当委托人雇用许多代理人并且无法监控他们的行为时的实施问题。我们区分两种情况：（i）当行为在代理之间是相互可观察的时，（ii）当行为根本不可观察时。在（i）中，存在一种机制，其中最好的结果作为唯一的完美均衡出现。在（ii）中，我们通过两个例子表明，如果委托人仅提供一组最优共享规则，则通常存在多个均衡。然而，我们证明委托人可以使用这些最优共享规则作为起点，构建一个具有独特的次佳完美贝叶斯均衡的多阶段机制。
In this paper we consider the problem of implementation when a principal hires many agents and is not able to monitor their actions. We distinguish two cases: (i) when actions are mutually observable among agents, (ii) when actions are not observable at all. In (i), there is a mechanism in which the first-best arises as a unique perfect equilibrium. In (ii), we show by two examples that typically there are multiple equilibria if the principal merely offers a set of optimal sharing rules. However, we prove that the principal can use these optimal sharing rules as a starting point and construct a multi-stage mechanism that has a unique second-best perfect Bayesian equilibrium.