Checking Intent-based Communication in Android with Intent Space Analysis
Checking Intent-based Communication in Android with Intent Space Analysis
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DOI：
10.1145/2897845.2897904
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发表时间：
2016-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yiming Jing;Gail-Joon Ahn;Adam Doupé;J. Yi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yiming Jing;Gail-Joon Ahn;Adam Doupé;J. Yi
基于意图的通信是Android中的一种应用间通信机制。尽管许多安全扩展已经证明了它的重要性，这些扩展使用策略驱动的强制访问控制来保护它，但一个被忽视的问题是安全策略的验证。检查一个安全扩展的策略确实很复杂。此外，基于意图的通信引入了更多的复杂性，因为它是由多个安全扩展介导的，这些扩展分别执行它们自己不兼容的、分布式的和动态的策略。本文寻求一种系统的方法来解决检查基于意图的通信所涉及的复杂性。为此，我们提出意图空间分析。意图空间分析将安全扩展的意图转发功能表述为几何意图空间上的转换。我们进一步引入了一个名为IntentScope的策略检查框架，它主动地、自动地将分布式策略聚合到一个整体的、可验证的视图中。我们根据定制的Android操作系统和商用Android设备来评估我们的方法。此外，我们进一步使用四个安全扩展进行实验，以演示我们的方法如何帮助识别每个扩展中的潜在漏洞。
Intent-based communication is an inter-application communication mechanism in Android. While its importance has been proven by plenty of security extensions that protect it with policy-driven mandatory access control, an overlooked problem is the verification of the security policies. Checking one security extension's policy is indeed complex. Furthermore, intent-based communication introduces even more complexities because it is mediated by multiple security extensions that respectively enforce their own incompatible, distributed, and dynamic policies. This paper seeks a systematic approach to address the complexities involved in checking intent-based communication. To this end, we propose intent space analysis. Intent space analysis formulates the intent forwarding functionalities of security extensions as transformations on a geometric intent space. We further introduce a policy checking framework called IntentScope that proactively and automatically aggregates distributed policies into a holistic and verifiable view. We evaluate our approach against customized Android OSs and commodity Android devices. In addition, we further conduct experiments with four security extensions to demonstrate how our approach helps identify potential vulnerabilities in each extension.