The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations in Canada
The Changing Latitude: Labor‐Sponsored Venture Capital Corporations in Canada
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不断变化的纬度：加拿大劳工资助的风险投资公司
DOI：
10.1111/corg.12057
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
F. Zhan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Johan;D. Schweizer;F. Zhan
Mandarin pt Type.经验主义。研究问题/问题。本文旨在了解公司治理和政府政策在加拿大劳动力发起的风险投资公司（LSVCC）的投资组合选择中所起的作用。我们调查是否改变税收政策宣布在安大略（2005年）有影响的投资行为的安大略LSVCC和是否独特的公司治理结构的LSVCC使他们能够专注于他们的投资授权后，这一公告。研究结果/见解。我们的研究结果表明，安大略的LSVCC更有可能在宣布税收政策变化后将上市公司纳入其基金投资组合。我们发现，2005年后，低收入国家对上市公司的投资增加了59.13%，而对私营公司的投资减少了13.17%。另一方面，我们发现在其他省份的低收入国家的投资行为没有显着的变化。就对上市公司的总投资百分比而言，我们发现安大略的低收入社区更有可能将对上市公司的总投资增加50%，并在短期内减少46.43%。然而，其他省份的低收入国家对上市公司的投资比例下降了58.33%，同期对私营企业的投资总额增加了38.33%。理论/学术影响。通过手工收集的专有数据集，我们能够通过政府税收政策变化导致的风格漂移的经验证据来增强对加拿大LSVCC独特结构的现有研究。我们比较了安大略省税收政策变化前后低收入公司的投资行为以及其他省份低收入公司的投资行为。我们假设，由于税收抵免的取消，某些投资限制的取消以及公司治理的削弱，LSVCC已经从最初的投资高风险风险公司的任务转向投资风险较低的上市公司。这种风格的转变可能是低收入、高回报和低收入公司为散户投资者潜在的财富转移或清算做准备的结果。更重要的是，我们发现LSVCC独特的公司治理结构可能会促进这种偏离其向中小企业提供风险资本的初衷。从业人员/政策影响。我们强调，风格漂移的LSVCC在安大略可能会导致这些基金的行为更像其他类型的共同基金和偏离其原来的任务，提供风险资本可能不仅证明不利于创业投资公司寻求这种资本，但也否定了任何多元化的好处寻求基金投资者。此外，这种偏离可能不一定证明LSVCC收取的较高管理费用比率是合理的。
Manuscript Type. Empirical. Research Question/Issue. This paper seeks to understand the role corporate governance and government policy plays in the portfolio choices of the labor‐sponsored venture capital corporations (LSVCCs) in Canada. We investigate whether or not the change in tax policy announced in Ontario (2005) had an impact on the investment behavior of Ontario LSVCCs and whether the unique corporate governance structure of LSVCCs enables them to focus on their investment mandate subsequent to this announcement. Research Findings/Insights. Our findings suggest that LSVCCs in Ontario are more likely to include public companies in their fund portfolios after the announcement of the change in tax policy. We find that after 2005, LSVCCs have increased their number of investments in public companies by 59.13 percent and in turn decreased their number of investments in private companies by 13.17 percent. On the other hand, we find no significant changes in investment behavior for LSVCCs in other provinces. In terms of the percentage of total investment in public companies, we find that the LSVCCs in Ontario are more likely to increase their total investment in public companies by 50 percent and to decrease their investment in the short term by 46.43 percent. LSVCCs in other provinces, however, are reducing their percentage of investment in public companies by 58.33 percent and increasing their total investment in private entrepreneurial firms by 38.33 percent in the same period. Theoretical/Academic Implications. With a hand‐collected proprietary dataset, we are able to augment existing studies on the unique structure of LSVCCs in Canada with empirical evidence on the style drift due to the changes in government tax policy. We compare and contrast the investment behavior of LSVCCs before and after the tax policy change in Ontario as well as the investment behavior of LSVCCs in other provinces. We hypothesize that as a result of the elimination of the tax credits, the removal of certain investment restrictions, and weaker corporate governance, LSVCCs have drifted from their original mandate to invest in high‐risk venture companies to investing in less risky public companies. Such style drift may be a result of LSVCCs preparing for potential wealth transfer or liquidation by retail investors. More importantly, we find the unique corporate governance structure of LSVCCs may facilitate this drift from their original purpose of providing venture capital to small and medium‐sized entrepreneurial (SME) firms. Practitioner/Policy Implications. We highlight that the style drift of LSVCCs in Ontario may result in such funds behaving more like other types of mutual funds and the deviation from their original mandate to provide venture capital may not only prove detrimental to entrepreneurial investee firms seeking such capital, but also negate any diversification benefits sought by fund investors. Also, such deviation may not necessarily justify the higher management expense ratio charged by LSVCCs.