Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation in an asymmetric Hawk-Dove game
Spatial games and the maintenance of cooperation in an asymmetric Hawk-Dove game
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空间博弈与非对称鹰鸽博弈中合作的维持
DOI：
10.1007/s11434-013-5810-6
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发表时间：
2013-06-01
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Wang RuiWu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
He JunZhou;Zhao Yue;Wang RuiWu
解释合作进化的经典理论通常依赖于参与者是对称互动的假设。然而，在现实中，几乎所有有充分记录的合作系统都表明，合作参与者实际上是不对称互动的，这种动态可能会极大地影响参与参与者的合作行为。在此，我们基于最著名的空间游戏——鹰鸽游戏开发了几个模型，同时也考虑了不对称互动的影响。这种非对称博弈有四种策略：强者合作或叛变，弱者合作或叛变。计算机模拟表明，随着收益成本比的减小，强势参与人背叛的概率减小，当收益成本比足够小时，各种策略都会被强势参与人的合作所取代。此外，弱势玩家很难生存，幸存下来的弱势玩家大多是叛逃者，类似于《盒装猪》。有趣的是，在某些情况下，各种策略的模式与相关因素是混沌的或振荡的。
Classical theories explaining the evolution of cooperation often rely on the assumption that the involved players are symmetrically interacted. However, in reality almost all well-documented cooperation systems show that cooperative players are in fact asymmetrically interacted and that this dynamic may greatly affect the cooperative behavior of the involved players. Here, we developed several models based on the most well known spatial game of the Hawk-Dove game, while also considering the effects of asymmetric interaction. Such asymmetric games possess four kinds of strategies: cooperation or defection of strong player and cooperation or defection of weak player. Computer simulations showed that the probability of defection of the strong player decreases with decreasing the benefit to cost ratio, and that all kinds of strategy will be substituted by cooperation on behalf of the strong player if the benefit to cost ratio is sufficiently small. Moreover, weak players find it difficult to survive and the surviving weak players are mostly defectors, similar to the Boxed Pigs game. Interestingly, the patterns of kinds of strategies are chaotic or oscillate in some conditions with the related factors.