Stimulating Cooperative Diversity in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks through Pricing
Stimulating Cooperative Diversity in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks through Pricing
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DOI：
10.1109/icc.2006.255655
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发表时间：
2006-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
N. Shastry;R. Adve
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Shastry;R. Adve
针对商业无线自组织网络中的自私节点之间的协作分集问题，提出了一种利用放大转发协议进行协作分集的方法。对于中继站来说，合作既代表了能源支出的实际成本，也代表了自身数据可能延迟的机会成本。由于节点是自私的，我们提出了一种定价博弈，通过补偿对中继的补偿来刺激合作。具体地说，在给定每个信道使用的价格的情况下，信源和中继器通过报销价格、发射机功率控制和转发/协议首选项进行交互，从而使它们的效用最大化。我们的定价博弈被证明收敛到纳什均衡，在该均衡中，合作分集在直观合理的网络几何结构处被诱导。
This paper addresses the issue of stimulating cooperative diversity, using the amplify-and-forward protocol, among selfish nodes in commercial wireless ad hoc networks. For the relay, cooperation represents both a real cost of energy expenditure and an opportunity cost of possible delays for its own data. Since nodes are selfish, we propose a pricing game that stimulates cooperation via reimbursements to the relay. Specifically, given the price per channel use, the source and relay interact through reimbursement prices, transmitter power control and forwarding/protocol preferences such that their utilities are maximized. Our pricing game is shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium where cooperative diversity is induced at intuitively reasonable network geometries.