Empathy as intersubjectivity: resolving Hume and Smith’s divide
Empathy as intersubjectivity: resolving Hume and Smith’s divide
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作为主体间性的同理心：解决休谟和史密斯的分歧
DOI：
10.1007/s11217-006-9022-2
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
M. Schertz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Schertz
虽然移情可以说是道德教育中一个重要的考虑因素，但这个概念本身一直站在脆弱的基础上。在这篇文章中，我声称我们对本体论二元论和离散主体性的坚持使我们对同理心的理解出现了问题。我认为我们的理解受到我们对自我的理解的限制。如果按照梅洛-庞蒂的思路，将自我定义为主体间性，那么共情的模糊性就会消失。在根据主体间性重新定义共情之后，我呼吁建立与发展研究相一致的教学关系，这为坚持这种现象的另一种概念提供了进一步的支持。
Although empathy is arguably an important factor to consider in moral education, the concept itself has consistently stood on tenuous ground. In this essay, I claim that our adherence to ontological dualism and discrete subjectivity have problematized our comprehension of empathy. I propose that our understanding is limited by our understanding of selfhood. If the self were defined as intersubjective, along the lines of Merleau-Ponty, then empathy’s ambiguities would dissipate. After reconceptualizing empathy in light of intersubjectivity, I call for pedagogical relations that are aligned with developmental research, which provides further support for adhering to an alternative conception of the phenomenon.
DOI：
10.5860/choice.34-2454
发表时间：
1994-10
期刊：
--
影响因子：
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作者：
Mark H. Davis
通讯作者：
Mark H. Davis