The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002: Implications for Compensation Contracts and Managerial Risk-Taking
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002: Implications for Compensation Contracts and Managerial Risk-Taking
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2002 年萨班斯·奥克斯利法案：对薪酬合同和管理风险承担的影响
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.568483
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Thomas Z Lys
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Cohen;Aiyesha Dey;Thomas Z Lys
2002年的萨班斯奥克斯利法案（SOX）引入了几项治理改革，大大增加了CEO的总风险敞口。我们研究了这些监管变化对首席执行官薪酬合同的影响及其对萨班斯法案之后风险承担的影响。我们发现，虽然整体薪酬没有变化，工资和奖金薪酬增加，期权薪酬下降后，通过SOX。SOX法案实施后，CEO财富对股东财富变化的敏感性也有所下降。这些结果表明，CEO薪酬的薪酬对业绩的敏感性在SOX之后有所下降。我们的研究结果表明，这些变化减少了研发投资和资本支出。我们还证明，上述CEO薪酬的变化对业绩的敏感性和他们的风险投资后SOX与股票回报波动性的减少。然而，我们并没有发现任何证据表明这些变化与未来经营业绩下降有关。
The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) introduced several governance reforms that considerably increased the total risk exposure of CEOs. We examine the effects of these regulatory changes on compensation contracts of CEOs and their effect on risk taking subsequent to SOX. We find that while overall compensation did not change, salary and bonus compensation increased and option compensation decreased following the passage of SOX. The sensitivity of CEO's wealth to changes in shareholder wealth also decreased after SOX. These results indicate that the pay for performance sensitivity of CEO compensation has declined following SOX. Our results indicate that these changes reduced investments in research and development, and capital expenditures. We also document that the above changes in CEOs' pay for performance sensitivities and their risky investments following SOX are associated with a reduction in stock return volatility. However, we do not find any evidence indicating that these changes are associated with lower future operating performance.