A Meeting of the Minds: Informal Agreements and Social Norms
A Meeting of the Minds: Informal Agreements and Social Norms
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思想的会议：非正式协议和社会规范
DOI：
10.1287/mnsc.2016.2429
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发表时间：
2017-06-01
影响因子：
5.4
通讯作者：
Jiang, Ming
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Krupka, Erin L.;Leider, Stephen;Jiang, Ming
通过协作游戏，我们直接引出了两种不同游戏的社会规范，其中一种是达成了采取第一个最佳行动的协议，另一种是不存在这样的协议。我们将规范数据与单独测量的选择数据结合起来预测行为的变化。我们证明，将社会规范作为效用成分显著提高了预测性能。然后我们将社会规范与内疚厌恶和撒谎厌恶进行比较。我们估计，在双独裁者博弈中，履行一项协议值得放弃大约10%的总收入，而在伯特兰博弈中，这一比例超过120%。我们表明，非正式协议通过对社会规范的直接影响以及对信念的间接影响来影响行为。
Using coordination games, we elicit social norms directly for two different games where either an agreement to take the first best action has been reached or where no such agreement exists. We combine the norms data with separately measured choice data to predict changes in behavior. We demonstrate that including social norms as a utility component significantly improves predictive performance. Then we compare social norms to guilt aversion and lying aversion. We estimate that honoring an agreement in the double dictator game is worth giving up approximately 10% of total earnings and more than 120% in the Bertrand game. We show that informal agreements affect behavior through their direct effect on social norms as well as through an indirect effect on beliefs.