Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor
Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor
复制标题
DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04052.x
复制
发表时间：
1995-09
影响因子：
8
通讯作者：
R. Rajan;Andrew Winton
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Rajan;Andrew Winton
尽管监管借款人被认为是金融机构的一项主要职能，但其他债权人的存在降低了机构贷款人这样做的动机。因此，必须制定贷款合同的结构，以增强贷款人监督的动机。契约决定了贷款的有效到期日，抵押的能力决定了贷款的有效优先顺序，这取决于贷款人的监督。因此，契约和抵押品都可以作为合同手段，增加贷款人监督的动机。这些结果与一些关于在机构贷款中使用契约和抵押品的程式化事实相一致。版权所有1995年，美国金融协会。
Although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions, the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender's incentives to do this. Thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender's incentives to monitor. Covenants make a loan's effective maturity, and the ability to collateralize makes a loan's effective priority, contingent on monitoring by the lender. Thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender's incentive to monitor. These results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending. Copyright 1995 by American Finance Association.