Tariffs, quality reversals and exit in vertically differentiated industries
Tariffs, quality reversals and exit in vertically differentiated industries
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垂直差异化行业的关税、质量逆转和退出
DOI：
10.1016/s0022-1996(02)00014-4
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发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
E. Petrakis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Iñigo Herguera;P. Kujal;E. Petrakis
在垂直差异化产业中，国内企业和外国企业首先选择产品的质量，然后在国内市场上进行数量或价格竞争。我们研究了在企业质量决策之前或之后选择关税的情况。这些情况分别被称为事前博弈和事后博弈。最优事后关税是正的，确保国内企业总是生产高质量的产品。最优事前关税是禁止性的，国内垄断下的福利低于事后关税，除非企业在价格上竞争，而且国内企业质量高。
In a vertically differentiated industry a domestic and a foreign firm first choose the quality of their goods and then compete in quantities, or prices, in the home market. We investigate the cases in which a tariff is chosen before, or after, the firms’ quality decision. These cases are referred to as the ex-ante and the ex-post game, respectively. Optimal ex-post tariffs are positive and ensure that the domestic firm always produces the high quality good. The optimal ex-ante tariff is prohibitive and welfare under domestic monopoly is lower than under ex-post tariffs, unless firms compete in prices and the domestic firm is high quality.