Do International Courts Enhance Compliance with International Law
Do International Courts Enhance Compliance with International Law
复制标题
国际法院是否加强了对国际法的遵守
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
K. Alter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Alter
国际法院支持者的主要希望之一是国际法院将以某种方式鼓励人们更加尊重国际法。事实上，我们对国际法院与遵守国际法之间的关系知之甚少。学术文献很少提出直接假设，因为它关注的是更广泛的问题，即国家为何遵守国际法，或影响国家遵守国际义务的背景因素。事实上，阅读这些文献很可能会得出这样的结论：法院对于加强国家对国际法的尊重几乎没有贡献。争论的另一方是一份文献，声称法院将提高国家遵守国际法的可能性，但几乎没有说明法院何时、如何或为何加强对国际法的遵守。本文回顾了有关国际法和国家行为的各种美国文献，并从这些文献中汲取了有关国际法院与遵守国际法之间潜在关系的见解。其目标是让国际读者更容易接触到美国文学，并超越关于执法是否能促进合规的广泛主张。第一部分和第二部分总结了有关加强遵守国际法的执法与管理方法的学术辩论，以及各国为何求助于国际法院。该分析旨在揭示国际法院如何特别有助于遵守国际法。第三部分从前面的分析中汲取见解，这些见解可能会解释国际法院在哪些方面促进或不促进遵守国际法的变化。我生成了一个包含十四个命题的列表，但并非所有命题都相互兼容。这份清单提供了一种初步的方法来思考解释国际法院对国家行为的影响的变化，并思考具体的例子如何可以或不可以推广到有关国际法院与遵守国际法之间关系的更大主张。加强合规并不是国际法院对国际政治的唯一影响。第四部分考虑了利用国际法院加强合规性的意外后果，并敦促我们更全面地思考国际法院如何影响国际关系。
One of the main hopes of proponents of international courts is that international courts will in some way encourage greater respect for international law. In truth, we know surprisingly little about the relationship between international courts and compliance with international law. The academic literature yields few direct hypotheses, because it has focused on broader questions of why states follow international law, or contextual factors shaping state compliance with international obligations. Indeed a read of this literature could well lead to the conclusion that courts will contribute very little to enhancing state respect for international law. On the other side of the debate is a literature that asserts that courts will enhance the likelihood that states comply with international law, with little development of when, how, or why courts will enhance compliance with international law. This paper reviews a broad variety of American literature on international law and state behavior, pulling from this literature insights about the potential relationship between international courts and compliance with international law. The goal is to both make American literature more accessible to international audiences, and to move beyond broad claims about whether or not enforcement works as an approach to facilitate compliance. Parts I and II summarize the academic debates regarding enforcement versus management approaches to increasing compliance with international law, and why states turn to international courts. The analysis aims to pull out how international courts in particular may be contributing to compliance with international law. Part III takes from the preceding analysis insights that might explain variation in where international courts do or do not facilitate compliance with international law. I generate a list of fourteen propositions, not all of which are compatible with each other. This list offers a beginning way to think about explaining variation in the influence of international courts on state behavior, and to think how specific examples may or may not generalize to larger claims about the relationship between international courts and compliance with international law. Enhancing compliance is not the only influence international courts may have in international politics. Part IV considers unintended consequences of using international courts to enhance compliance, and urges us to think more holistically about how international courts may be influencing international relations.