Organised Crime, Insider Information and Optimal Leniency
Organised Crime, Insider Information and Optimal Leniency
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有组织犯罪、内幕信息和最佳宽大处理
DOI：
10.1111/ecoj.12382
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Immordino
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Piccolo;G. Immordino
当“低级”犯罪分子被要求与司法部门合作以换取司法宽大时，他们的信息会产生事后租金，这实际上可能有利于他们的老板并增加犯罪利润。因此，最优的宽大政策必须权衡有用的内幕信息披露的积极影响和这些租金对组织犯罪回报产生的积极外部性。由于这种紧张关系，最大限度地减少犯罪可能性的特赦促使立法者通过排除拥有潜在有用知识的线人来限制参与该计划。这一结果经过了多次稳健性检查。
When ‘low-rank’ criminals are offered to cooperate with justice in exchange of judicial leniency, their information generates ex post rents that may actually favour their bosses and increase the crime profitability. Hence, an optimal leniency policy must trade off the positive impact of helpful disclosure of insider information and the positive externality that these rents exert on the organisation's returns from crime. Due to this tension, the amnesty that minimises the probability of crime induces the Legislator to restrict the access to the programme, by excluding informants owning potentially useful knowledge. This result survives to a number of robustness checks.