Are we explaining consciousness yet?
Are we explaining consciousness yet?
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DOI：
10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00130-x
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发表时间：
2001-04-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
Dennett, D
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dennett, D
理论家们正从不同的角度出发，将意识的整体神经元工作空间模型汇聚到一个新的版本上，但仍存在一些有待解决的困惑。特别是，理论家们必须抵制将全球可及性视为意识的原因（如果意识是某种其他的、更进一步的条件）的诱惑;相反，它就是意识。一个有用的比喻来保持这个难以捉摸的想法的焦点是，意识就像大脑中的名声。它不是一种特殊的表征媒介，也不是某些国家所拥有的附加属性;正是这种相互的可访问性赋予了某些信息国家权力，这些权力是伴随着主体对该信息的意识而产生的。像名声一样，意识不是一种暂时的状态，也不是一种纯粹的倾向性状态，而是一种随着时间的推移而产生的实际影响。承担解释对意识至关重要的后果的任务的理论家们，往往看起来把意识的主体排除在外，而事实上他们是在提供对主体的分析，这是任何严肃的意识理论的必要组成部分。(C)2001 Elsevier Science B. V.保留所有权利。
Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness las if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of representation, or an added property some states have; it is the very mutual accessibility that gives some informational states the powers that come with a subject's consciousness of that information. Like fame, consciousness is not a momentary condition, or a purely dispositional state, but rather a matter of actual influence over time. Theorists who take on the task of accounting for the aftermath that is critical for consciousness often appear to be leaving out the Subject of consciousness, when in fact they are providing an analysis of the Subject, a necessary component in any serious theory of consciousness. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.