Living in Fear: The Dynamics of Extortion in Mexico's Drug War
Living in Fear: The Dynamics of Extortion in Mexico's Drug War
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DOI：
10.1177/0010414019879958
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发表时间：
2019-10-29
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Romero, Vidal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Magaloni, Beatriz;Robles, Gustavo;Romero, Vidal
为什么贩毒组织有时掠夺他们活动的社区，但有时向这些社区提供援助？如何解释他们对公民社会的勒索和拉拢策略？使用来自墨西哥的新调查数据，包括引发对潜在非法行为的反应的清单实验，本文衡量了DTO中敲诈勒索和帮助的流行率。为了支持我们的理论，这些数据表明，竞争组织之间的领土争夺会产生更多的敲诈勒索，相反，当DTO垄断控制一块地盘时，他们提供更多的帮助。这篇文章还揭示了其他因素，包括与国家的合作程度、领导层的稳定性和DTO的组织，以及当地犯罪企业的价值和物流。
Why do drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) sometimes prey on the communities in which they operate but sometimes provide assistance to these communities? What explains their strategies of extortion and co-optation toward civil society? Using new survey data from Mexico, including list experiments to elicit responses about potentially illegal behavior, this article measures the prevalence of extortion and assistance among DTOs. In support of our theory, these data show that territorial contestation among rival organizations produces more extortion and, in contrast, DTOs provide more assistance when they have monopoly control over a turf. The article uncovers other factors that also shape DTOs' strategies toward the population, including the degree of collaboration with the state, leadership stability and DTO organization, and the value and logistics of the local criminal enterprise.