Information and Auction Performance: A Laboratory Study of Conservation Auctions for Spatially Contiguous Land Management
Information and Auction Performance: A Laboratory Study of Conservation Auctions for Spatially Contiguous Land Management
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DOI：
10.1007/s10640-014-9798-4
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发表时间：
2015-07
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
Simanti Banerjee;A. Kwasnica;J. Shortle
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Simanti Banerjee;A. Kwasnica;J. Shortle
公共机构使用保护拍卖从私人土地所有者那里购买环境友好的土地使用。我们提出了一个迭代保护拍卖的结构，排名出价根据一个评分规则，旨在采购空间相邻的保护土地使用项目。实验室实验进行了两种信息条件下，这种拍卖的性能进行比较。在一种情况下，受试者有知识的空间目标实施的评分规则，在另一种情况下，他们没有。结果表明，寻租加剧了更多的信息和投标人熟悉拍卖。另一方面，揭示空间信息对拍卖效率没有影响。
Conservation auctions are used by public agencies to procure environmental friendly land uses from private landowners. We present the structure of an iterative conservation auction that ranks bids according to a scoring rule intended to procure spatially adjacent conservation land use projects. Laboratory experiments are conducted to compare the performance of this auction under two information conditions. Under one condition subjects have knowledge about the spatial goal implemented by the scoring rule and in the other case they don’t. The results indicate that rent-seeking is intensified with more information and increased bidder familiarity with the auction. Revealing the spatial information on the other hand has no impact on auction efficiency.