DEA production games

DEA production games
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DOI:
10.1016/j.ejor.2013.06.004
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发表时间:
2013-12
期刊:
Eur. J. Oper. Res.
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
S. Lozano
S. Lozano
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
S. Lozano

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本文对线性生产对策进行了扩展,使之不再假设具有固定技术系数的线性生产技术,而考虑了更一般的非参数DEA生产技术。不同的组织被认为拥有自己的技术,合作博弈源于汇集他们可用的投入、集体处理和分享收入的可能性。考虑了两种可能性:使用通过合并各自的技术而产生的联合生产技术,或者每个合作组织保留自己的技术。这导致了两个不同的DEA生产游戏,这两个游戏都是完全平衡的,都有一个非空的核心。给出了利用大联盟的最优对偶解计算稳定解的一种简单方法。全面合作方案显然为所涉组织带来了更多好处,尽管技术共享并不总是可能的。最后给出了该方法的应用实例。
In this paper, linear production games are extended so that instead of assuming a linear production technology with fixed technological coefficients, the more general, non-parametric, DEA production technology is considered. Different organizations are assumed to possess their own technology and the cooperative game arises from the possibility of pooling their available inputs, collectively processing them and sharing the revenues. Two possibilities are considered: using a joint production technology that results from merging their respective technologies or each cooperating organization keeping its own technology. This gives rise to two different DEA production games, both of which are totally balanced and have a non-empty core. A simple way of computing a stable solution, using the optimal dual solution for the grand coalition, is presented. The full cooperation scenario clearly produces more benefits for the organizations involved although the implied technology sharing is not always possible. Examples of applications of the proposed approach are given.