Residual income past and future
Residual income past and future
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过去和未来的剩余收入
DOI：
10.1006/mare.1998.0091
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发表时间：
1998
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
M. Walker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Bromwich;M. Walker
摘要本文讨论了以剩余收益概念为基础的价值管理方法的优点和缺点，以此作为基于激励的奖励制度的基础。这些制度的目的是鼓励部门经理进行最佳的公司投资选择，并鼓励他们采取行动，就像他们是部门的独立所有者一样，分担所有亏损和所有利润。文章的第一部分根据20世纪60年代和70年代早期国际扶轮的辩论来考虑这些制度，这场辩论提出了适用于当今基于价值的制度的一些问题。报告还考虑了最近为解决先前辩论中产生的主要问题所作的努力--如何确保单个期间的国际收支平衡与项目净现值相符。文章的第二部分简要综述了基于RI的激励机制的研究现状。然后提出了一个可能的进一步研究计划，重点是金融理论中的相关研究。
Abstract This article considers the strengths and weaknesses of value-based management approaches based upon the residual income (RI) concept as the basis for incentive-based reward systems. The objective of these systems is to encourage optimal corporate investment selection by divisional managers and to encourage them to act as if they were independent owners of their divisions sharing a proportion of all losses and all profits. Part 1 of the article considers these systems in the light of the earlier RI debate in the 1960s and 1970s which raised a number of problems applicable to today's value-based systems. It also considers recent attempts to solve, perhaps, the major problem generated in the earlier debate—how to ensure that a single period RI is congruent with project net present value. Part 2 of the article provides a brief survey of current research into incentive systems based on RI. It then presents a possible programme of further research emphasising relevant research in finance theory.