The evolution of fairness norms
The evolution of fairness norms
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DOI：
10.1177/104346398010003001
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发表时间：
1998-08-01
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Binmore, KG
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Binmore, KG
强有力的证据表明，现代狩猎采集社会接近马克思的理想，即每个人都根据能力做出贡献，根据需要接受。有人争辩说，这种形式的社会组织既不能用互惠也不能用亲属关系来解释。因此，建立基于社会生物学原理的进化社会契约理论的尝试从一开始就似乎注定要失败，因为同样的作者认为，现代觅食社会以化石的形式保存着后来所有社会契约演变而来的那种社会契约。本文概述了这一问题对我自己的社会契约理论的重要性。然后，它使用博弈论的论点来论证互惠和亲属关系实际上是维持现代狩猎-采集社会的准功利主义社会契约的两大支柱。最后，现代觅食者拥有类似于他们史前祖先的社会契约的想法受到了质疑。
The evidence is strong that modern hunter-gatherer societies approximate the Marxian ideal in which each contributes according to ability and receives according to need. It has been argued that such a form of social organization can be explained by neither reciprocity nor kinship. Attempts to found evolutionary social contract theories on sociobiological principles therefore seem doomed from the outset, since the same authors believe that modem foraging societies preserve in fossil form the type of social contract from which all later social contracts evolved. This paper outlines the importance of the issue to my own social contract theory. It then uses game-theoretic arguments to argue that reciprocity and kinship are actually the twin pillars that maintain the quasi-utilitarian social contracts of modem hunter-gatherer societies. Finally, the idea that modem foragers have social contracts similar to their prehistoric ancestors is questioned.