International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator
International Economic Sanctions Against a Dictator
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针对独裁者的国际经济制裁
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0343.2004.00130.x
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
W. Mertens
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
W. H. Kaempfer;A. Lowenberg;W. Mertens
Wintrobe（1990，1998）的独裁模型被用来考察经济制裁对独裁者的影响。研究表明，独裁者对权力水平的选择，以及作为权力生产投入的忠诚和镇压的数量，受到制裁类型和程度以及制裁对反对派政治有效性的影响。团体。制裁对忠诚和镇压的价格有直接和间接的影响，并可能产生租金，这些租金可能被独裁者或反对派攫取。版权所有Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004。
Wintrobe's (1990, 1998) dictatorship model is adapted to examine the impacts of economic sanctions on an autocrat. It is shown that the dictator's choice of the level of power, and the quantities of loyalty and repression used as inputs in the production of power, are affected by the type and magnitude of sanctions and by the impact of sanctions on the political effectiveness of opposition groups. Sanctions have direct and indirect effects on the prices of loyalty and repression as well as potentially generating rents that might be captured either by the dictator or by the opposition. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2004.