Manufacturer's pricing strategy for supply chain with warranty period-dependent demand

Manufacturer's pricing strategy for supply chain with warranty period-dependent demand
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DOI:
10.1016/j.omega.2011.12.010
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发表时间:
2012-12
影响因子:
6.9
通讯作者:
Xu Chen;L. Li;Ming Zhou
Xu Chen;L. Li;Ming Zhou
中科院分区:
管理学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Xu Chen;L. Li;Ming Zhou

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本文提出了一个两级供应链,包括一个制造商和两个竞争的零售商,与保修期相关的需求与制造商的定价策略的问题进行了审查。制造商作为Stackelberg的领导者,向两个面临保修期依赖需求且具有不同销售成本的竞争零售商指定批发价格。制造商考虑三种定价方案:(1)为两个零售商设定相同的价格,而忽略他们在销售成本方面的差异;(2)根据销售成本为每个零售商设定不同的价格;(3)根据行业的平均销售成本为两个零售商设定相同的价格。本文利用博弈论方法,推导了不同定价策略下零售商的最优保修期及其最优利润、制造商的最优批发价格及其最优利润。我们的分析表明,零售商的结果是相同的策略1或策略3。此外,我们还比较了制造商的不同定价策略对供应链决策和利润的影响。研究结果表明,在销售成本信息对称的情况下,制造商应该采用策略2,在销售成本信息不对称的情况下,制造商应该采用策略3。
This article presents a review of the issues associated with a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a two-echelon supply chain that comprises one manufacturer and two competing retailers, with warranty period-dependent demands. The manufacturer, as a Stackelberg leader, specifies wholesale prices to two competing retailers who face warranty period-dependent demand and have different sales costs. The manufacturer considers three pricing options: (1) setting the same price for both retailers, while disregarding their difference with regard to sales cost; (2) setting a different price to each retailer on the basis of their sales cost; and (3) setting the same price to both retailers according to the average sales cost of the industry. In this article, the retailers' optimal warranty periods and their optimal profit, manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, and his/her optimal profit associated with different pricing strategies have been derived using the game theory. Our analysis shows that the results for retailers are the same with Strategy 1 or Strategy 3. In addition, we compared the effects of different pricing strategies of the manufacturer on supply chain decisions and profit. We conclude from the results that the manufacturer should either adopt Strategy 2 with symmetrical sales cost information or Strategy 3 if retailers' sales costs are asymmetrical.