Alternative assessment of strategy use with self-report instruments: a discussion
Alternative assessment of strategy use with self-report instruments: a discussion
复制标题
使用自我报告工具对策略使用进行替代评估：讨论
DOI：
10.1007/s11409-011-9080-x
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
M. Veenman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Veenman
Strategy use is a very broad term for controlled and consciously applied procedural knowledge, in contrast with skills that are automated to a more or lesser extent (Gagne et al. 1993). Both terms, however, are used interchangeably when referring to processes that direct and support problem solving and learning. There is a gray area in between controlled strategy use and the automated performance of skills (Veenman 2011). For instance, monitoring processes may be consciously applied during reading, but often run in the background until an error or anomaly is detected. The latter is the case with more experienced readers. In this special issue, many of the strategic processes described operate in this gray area. For instance, confidence judgments or inference processes are neither fully controlled, nor fully automated. Consequently, learners may not be fully aware of ongoing processes, which may affect the verbalization of these processes in self-reports. Strategic processes may be cognitive or metacognitive by nature. According to Nelson (1996), cognitive and metacognitive processes operate at different levels of the cognitive system that represent different functions. Higher-order metacognitive processes monitor and regulate lower-order cognitive processes that, in turn, shape behavior. Thus, drawing inferences is a cognitive activity, but the self-induced decision to initiate such activity is a metacognitive one (Veenman 2011). The authors of this special issue diverge in the perspective that they have chosen for studying strategic processes in reading. Schellings (this issue) discusses the role and assessment of learning strategies, which encompass both cognitive and metacognitive strategies, but her empirical work is entirely based on assessment methods for metacognition. Braten and Stromso (this issue) avoid classifying the inference processes in their study as either cognitive or metacognitive. Magliano et al. (this issue) clearly state that their RSAT does not provide a direct measure of metacognitive processes, but rather captures (cognitive) information-processing activities. On the other hand, they do acknowledge that metacognitive awareness is prerequisite to adequately Metacognition Learning (2011) 6:205–211 DOI 10.1007/s11409-011-9080-x
