Marketplace Lending: A New Banking Paradigm?
Marketplace Lending: A New Banking Paradigm?
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3102984
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发表时间：
2018-05
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
B. Vallée;Yao Zeng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
B. Vallée;Yao Zeng
市场借贷依赖于投资者的筛选和信息生产，这是对传统银行模式的重大偏离。从理论上讲，老练投资者的参与改善了筛选结果，也在投资者之间造成了逆向选择。为了使贷款额最大化，该平台权衡了这两种力量。随着平台的发展，最优地增加了平台预审强度，但减少了对投资者的信息提供。使用新颖的投资者层面数据，我们发现成熟的投资者系统性地表现优于投资者，当平台减少向投资者提供的信息时，这种表现会缩小。我们的研究结果揭示了在这种新的借贷模式中信息生产的最佳分配。收于2018年8月29日；编辑决定2018年7月1日编辑Itay Goldstein作者们提供了一份互联网附录，可以在牛津大学出版社的网站上找到，就在最终发表论文的链接旁边。
Marketplace lending relies on screening and information production by investors, a major deviation from the traditional banking paradigm. Theoretically, the participation of sophisticated investors improves screening outcomes and also creates adverse selection among investors. In maximizing loan volume, the platform trades off these two forces. As the platform develops, it optimally increases platform prescreening intensity but decreases information provision to investors. Using novel investor-level data, we find that sophisticated investors systematically outperform, and this outperformance shrinks when the platform reduces information provision to investors. Our findings shed light on the optimal distribution of information production in this new lending model.Received August 29, 2018; editorial decision July 1, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.