Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas
Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.040
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发表时间：
2006-03-21
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Doebeli, M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hauert, C;Michor, F;Doebeli, M
自然选择导致的合作的出现和维持是进化生物学中一个持久的难题，人们已经使用各种受不同生物情况启发的博弈论模型进行了研究。最广泛研究的游戏是囚徒困境，雪堆游戏和副产品互惠对相互作用，以及公共产品游戏在更大的群体相互作用的个人。在这里，我们提出了一个合作的社会困境中，所有的传统方案可以恢复为特殊情况下的一般框架。在社会困境中，合作者以一定的代价为群体提供利益，而背叛者则通过收获利益而不承担合作的代价来剥削群体。使用折扣和协同作用的概念来描述利益如何积累时，一组相互作用的个体中存在一个以上的合作者，我们恢复的进化动力学的四个基本场景由（i）主导的背叛，（ii）共存的叛逃者和合作者，（iii）主导合作和（iv）双稳定性，其中合作者和叛逃者不能互相入侵。一般来说，对于三个或更多个相互作用的个体的群体，可能会发生更进一步、更复杂的动态。我们的框架提供了第一个统一的方法来模拟不同类型的社会困境中的合作。(C)2005爱思唯尔有限公司保留所有权利。
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation by natural selection is an enduring conundrum in evolutionary biology, which has been studied using a variety of game theoretical models inspired by different biological situations. The most widely studied games are the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Snowdrift game and by-product mutualism for pairwise interactions, as well as Public Goods games in larger groups of interacting individuals. Here, we present a general framework for cooperation in social dilemmas in which all the traditional scenarios can be recovered as special cases. In social dilemmas, cooperators provide a benefit to the group at some cost, while defectors exploit the group by reaping the benefits without bearing the costs of cooperation. Using the concepts of discounting and synergy for describing how benefits accumulate when more than one cooperator is present in a group of interacting individuals, we recover the four basic scenarios of evolutionary dynamics given by (i) dominating defection, (ii) coexistence of defectors and cooperators, (iii) dominating cooperation and (iv) bi-stability, in which cooperators and defectors cannot invade each other. Generically, for groups of three or more interacting individuals further, more complex, dynamics can occur. Our framework provides the first unifying approach to model cooperation in different kinds of social dilemmas. (C) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.