Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance
Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance
复制标题
DOI：
10.1257/pol.1.2.31
复制
发表时间：
2009-08-01
影响因子：
5.3
通讯作者：
Chetty, Raj
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chetty, Raj
MartinFeldstein（1999）广泛使用的无谓损失的应税收入公式假设逃税和避税的边际社会成本等于税率。这一条件在实践中可能会因两个原因而被违反。第一，规避和避税的部分成本转移到其他代理人身上。其次，有些人高估了逃避和逃避的成本。在这种情况下，超额负担取决于应纳税收入和总劳动收入弹性的加权平均数，其权重由保护收入不纳税的资源成本决定。这一广义公式意味着，尽管有证据表明，高收入者的收入对边际税率高度敏感，但对高收入者征税的效率成本并不一定很大。
Martin Feldstein's (1999) widely used taxable income formula for deadweight loss assumes the marginal social cost of evasion and avoidance equals the tax rate. This condition is likely to be violated in practice for two reasons. First, some of the costs of evasion and avoidance are transfers to other agents. Second, some individuals overestimate the costs of evasion and avoidance. In such situations, excess burden depends on a weighted average of the taxable income and total earned income elasticities, with the weight determined by the resource cost of sheltering income from taxation. This generalized formula implies the efficiency cost of taxing high income individuals is not necessarily large despite evidence that their reported incomes are highly sensitive to marginal tax rates.