Artifacts are not ascribed essences, nor are they treated as belonging to kinds
Artifacts are not ascribed essences, nor are they treated as belonging to kinds
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人工制品不被赋予本质，也不被视为属于种类
DOI：
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Malt
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Sloman;B. Malt
我们评估三个理论的分类领域的文物。有两种理论是心理本质主义的版本;他们认为人工制品分类是通过诉诸关于对象真实的、潜在的性质的信念来判断一个种类的成员资格的问题。第一个版本认为，本质可以与对象的预期功能相一致。第二种观点认为，本质可以与创造者的意向性成员身份相一致。第三种理论叫做“极简主义”。它指出，判断类成员是基于信仰的因果关系的法律，而不是信仰的本质。我们的结论是，每一种理论都在解释人们如何用人工制品进行日常分类和归纳时做出了不必要的假设。物质主义理论错误地假设，相信人工制品有本质是分类的关键。所有的理论都错误地假设人工制品被视为属于稳定的、固定的种类。人工制品分类的理论必须面对这样一个事实，即人工制品的类别是不稳定的，而是取决于手头的分类任务。
We evaluate three theories of categorisation in the domain of artifacts. Two theories are versions of psychological essentialism; they posit that artifact categorisation is a matter of judging membership in a kind by appealing to a belief about the true, underlying nature of the object. The first version holds that the essence can be identified with the intended function of objects. The second holds that the essence can be identified with the creator’s intended kind membership. The third theory is called ‘minimalism”. It states that judgements of kind membership are based on beliefs about causal laws, not beliefs about essences. We conclude that each theory makes unnecessary assumptions in explaining how people make everyday classifications and inductions with artifacts. Essentialist theories go wrong in assuming that the belief that artifacts have essences is critical to categorisation. All theories go wrong in assuming that artifacts are treated as if they belong to stable, fixed kinds. Theories of artifact categorisation must contend with the fact that artifact categories are not stable, but rather depend on the categorisation task at hand.