Bilateral Oligopoly in Pollution Permit Markets: Experimental Evidence
Bilateral Oligopoly in Pollution Permit Markets: Experimental Evidence
复制标题
污染许可证市场的双边寡头垄断：实验证据
DOI：
10.1111/ecin.12087
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Andrew Yates
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Schnier;M. Doyle;J. Rigby;Andrew Yates
我们使用由Klemperer和Meyer（1989）、Hendricks和McAfee（2010）以及Malueg和Yates（2009）讨论的供给函数均衡模型，对双边寡头垄断中的行为进行了实验研究。我们关注市场规模和企业异质性程度对市场均衡的影响。我们的研究结果表明，实验中的受试者认识到双边寡头垄断中的战略激励，但他们并没有利用这些激励达到理论预测的确切程度。我们发现对预测市场结果的支持较弱，因为市场效率不取决于市场规模，而且在某些情况下，买家或卖家在从市场中提取租金方面更成功。（结13、5、9）
type="main" xml:id="ecin12087-abs-0001"> We experimentally investigate behavior in a bilateral oligopoly using a supply function equilibria model discussed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989), Hendricks and McAfee (2010), and Malueg and Yates (2009). We focus on the role that market size and the degree of firm heterogeneity have on the market equilibrium. Our results indicate that subjects within the experiment recognize the strategic incentives in a bilateral oligopoly, but they do not exploit these incentives to the exact magnitude predicted by theory. We find weaker support for predicted market outcomes, as market efficiency does not depend on market size, and in some cases buyers or sellers are more successful at extracting the rents from the market. ( JEL L13 , Q5 , C9 )
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
KLEMPERER, PD;MEYER, MA
通讯作者：
MEYER, MA