Equilibria and learning dynamics in mixed network coordination/anti-coordination games
Equilibria and learning dynamics in mixed network coordination/anti-coordination games
复制标题
混合网络协调/反协调博弈中的均衡和学习动态
DOI：
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Martina Vanelli
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Laura Arditti;G. Como;F. Fagnani;Martina Vanelli
虽然网络协调游戏和网络反协调游戏在文献中受到了相当多的关注，但已知协调和反协调玩家共存的网络游戏表现出更复杂的行为。事实上，根据网络结构的不同，这样的博弈甚至可能不存在纯策略纳什均衡。著名的硬币匹配（不协调）游戏就是一个例子。本文首先给出了任意大小的混合网络协调/反协调对策中纯策略纳什均衡存在的图论条件。对于满足这些条件的情况，我们研究了最佳响应动力学的渐近行为，并提供了有限时间收敛到纳什均衡集的充分条件。我们的结果建立在网络内聚性概念的扩展和改进以及网络不可分解性新概念的制定上。
Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more complex behaviors. In fact, depending on the network structure, such games may even fail to have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. An example is represented by the well-known matching pennies (discoordination) game.In this work, we first provide graph-theoretic conditions for the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in mixed network coordination/anti-coordination games of arbitrary size. For the case where such conditions are met, we then study the asymptotic behavior of best-response dynamics and provide sufficient conditions for finite-time convergence to the set of Nash equilibria. Our results build on an extension and refinement of the notion of network cohesiveness and on the formulation of the new concept of network indecomposibility.
反协调网络游戏中的学习控制
影响因子：
4.2
作者：
Eksin, Ceyhun;Paarporn, Keith
通讯作者：
Paarporn, Keith