Myopic Economic Agents
Myopic Economic Agents
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短视的经济代理人
DOI：
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发表时间：
1981
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Lucinda M. Lewis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Donald J. Brown;Lucinda M. Lewis
如果经济主体更喜欢随时间变化的消费计划 x bar 而不是随时间变化的消费计划 bar，那么他更喜欢 x bar x 而不是 y bar，并通过任何在未来足够远的时间开始的固定消费计划来增强。一个经济主体被认为是单调近视的，如果当他更喜欢状态或然消费计划 x 柱而不是状态或然消费计划 y 柱时，那么他更喜欢 y 柱的任何足够大的有限截断。如果在时间（状态）-或有消费计划空间上的拓扑是弱（单调）近视的，则如果在该拓扑中连续的每个完全偏好关系都是弱（单调）近视的。给出了弱（单调）近视豪斯多夫局部凸线性拓扑及其对偶空间的表征。
An economic agent is said to be weakly myopic if he prefers a time-contingent consumption plan x bar to a time-contingent consumption plany bar, then he prefers x bar x to y bar augmented by any stationary consumption plan which begins sufficiently far in the future. An economic agent is said to be monotonically myopic if when he prefers a state-contingent consumption plan x bar to a state-contingent consumption plan y bar, then he prefers any sufficiently large finite truncation of y bar. A topology on the space of time (state)-contingent consumption plans is said to be weakly (monotonically) myopic if every complete preference relation which is continuous in this topology is weakly (monotonically) myopic. A characterization of weakly (monotonically) myopic Hausdorff locally convex linear topologies and their dual spaces is given.