Negotiation in the Commons: Incorporating Field and Experimental Evidence into a Theory of Local Collective Action
Negotiation in the Commons: Incorporating Field and Experimental Evidence into a Theory of Local Collective Action
复制标题
公地谈判：将实地和实验证据纳入地方集体行动理论
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
0.4
通讯作者：
J. Carpenter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Carpenter
本文发展了一个社区层面的集体行动模型，以解释社会困境的制度解决方案的演变。该模型的假设基于人种学和实验研究的证据，这些研究表明，公共池资源的可排除性程度通过形成内部组的基础来影响代理行为。该模型的主要预测是，社区成员将制定保护合作的制度规则，合作水平将由社区规则选择内生决定。一项新实验的结果支持了这些预测。
This paper develops a model of community level collective action to explain the evolution of institutional solutions to social dilemmas. The assumptions of the model are based on evidence from ethnographic and experimental studies that show that the degree of excludability of a common pool resource affects agent behavior by forming the basis for an ingroup. The major predictions of the model are that members of a community will develop institutional rules to protect cooperation and that the level of cooperation will be determined endogenously by the community's rule choice. The results of a new experiment support these predictions.