Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers

Competition in public service provision: The role of not-for-profit providers
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DOI:
10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.04.004
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发表时间:
2018-06-01
影响因子:
9.8
通讯作者:
Malcomson, James M.
Malcomson, James M.
中科院分区:
经济学1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Besley, Timothy;Malcomson, James M.

文献摘要

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对于卫生和教育等公共服务,消费者无法直接评估服务的质量。许多这类服务是由垄断的非营利提供者提供的,人们担心营利提供者可能以牺牲质量为代价来增加利润。本文探讨了当存在不可观察的质量时,营利性供应商进入的影响。该模型产生了三个关键的政策相关的见解。首先,通过开发一种新的方法来处理不同组织形式之间的竞争,它精确地构建了相关的权衡。其次,它显示了保持现任非营利组织作为积极提供者的价值。第三,它的特点是最佳的支付(或凭证价值)的进入者为每个消费者谁切换的方式,可以应用经验。(C)2018爱思唯尔B.V.保留所有权利。
With public services such as health and education, it is not straightforward for consumers to assess the quality of provision. Many such services are provided by monopoly not-for-profit providers and there is concern that for-profit providers may increase profit at the expense of quality. This paper explores the implications of entry by for-profit providers when there is unobserved quality. The model generates three key policy relevant insights. First, by developing a novel approach to competition between different organizational forms, it frames the relevant trade-offs precisely. Second, it shows the value of keeping an incumbent not-for-profit as an active provider. Third, it characterizes the optimal payment (or voucher value) to an entrant for each consumer who switches in a way that can be applied empirically. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.