Abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences
Abstention in elections with asymmetric information and diverse preferences
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DOI：
10.2307/2585402
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发表时间：
1999-06-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Pesendorfer, W
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Feddersen, TJ;Pesendorfer, W
我们分析了一个两个候选人的无成本投票选举模型，其中选民具有不对称的信息和不同的偏好。我们证明，一个严格的积极部分的选民将弃权，尽管如此，选举有效地汇总选民的私人信息。通过举例，Mle表明，更多的知情选民更有可能投票比他们不太知情的同行。然而，增加知情选民的比例可能会导致更高的预防水平。我们的结论表明，有偏见的信息分布可以借给有偏见的投票人口，但不倾向于有偏见的结果。
We analyze a model of a two-candidate election with costless voting in which voters have asymmetric information and diverse preferences. We demonstrate that a strictly positive fraction of the electorate will abstain and that, nevertheless, elections effectively aggregate voters' private infomation. Using examples, Mle show that more informed voters are more likely to vote than their less informed counterparts. Increasing the fraction of the electorate that is informed, however; may lead to higher levels of abstention. We conclude by showing that a biased distribution of information can lend to a biased voting population but does not lean to biased outcomes.