Associated consistency, value and graphs
Associated consistency, value and graphs
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相关的一致性、价值和图表
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-019-00688-y
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Florian Navarro
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Gérard Hamiache;Florian Navarro
本文给出了不完全通信合作对策的一个新值的公理化刻画。这个结果是通过对Hamiache提出的相关博弈进行轻微修改而得到的（Games Econ Behav 26：59-78，1999; Int J Game Theory 30：279-289，2001）。这种新的关联对策可以表示为一个矩阵公式。我们生成了一系列连续的关联对策，并证明了它的极限是一个非本质对策。三个公理（关联一致性，非本质博弈，连续性）描述了一个唯一的共享规则。组合参数和矩阵工具提供了一个计算解决方案的过程。当通信完成时，新的共享规则与Shapley值一致。
This article presents an axiomatic characterization of a new value for cooperative games with incomplete communication. The result is obtained by slight modifications of associated games proposed by Hamiache (Games Econ Behav 26:59–78, 1999; Int J Game Theory 30:279–289, 2001). This new associated game can be expressed as a matrix formula. We generate a series of successive associated games and show that its limit is an inessential game. Three axioms (associated consistency, inessential game, continuity) characterize a unique sharing rule. Combinatorial arguments and matrix tools provide a procedure to compute the solution. The new sharing rule coincides with the Shapley value when the communication is complete.