Bonding and the Agency Problem: Evidence from the Royal African Company, 1672-1691
Bonding and the Agency Problem: Evidence from the Royal African Company, 1672-1691
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联结和代理问题：来自皇家非洲公司的证据，1672-1691
DOI：
10.1006/exeh.1994.1013
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发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
A. Carlos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Carlos
摘要本文着重讨论了文献中广泛存在的一种论点，即早期特许公司的管理人员是为了自己的利益而经营的，因此是这些公司自己最大的敌人。使用最近的工作，从劳动和有效的合同文献和档案材料，从这些公司之一的皇家非洲公司，我认为，在文献中流行的观点大大夸大了代理机会主义的水平。皇家非洲公司与其管理人员之间的合同设计得很好，以减轻道德风险。虽然该公司支付了非补偿性差额，但合同的有趣特点是使用了担保。这项研究，虽然认为这些早期的特许公司没有削弱管理机会主义，描述了一个功能齐全的债券市场的经理。该文件还认为，皇家非洲公司由于总部结构不适当（公司章程规定的结构），无法在下属和上级之间建立一个有助于进一步减少道德风险的内部信任网络。
Abstract The paper focuses on the argument found extensively in the literature that the managers of early chartered companies operated in their own self-interest and thus were these companies own worst enemies. Using recent work from both the labor and the efficient contracts literature and archival material from one of these companies-the Royal African Company-I argue that the view prevalent in the literature greatly overstates the level of agent opportunism. The contract between the Royal African Company and its managers was well designed to mitigate moral hazard. While the Company paid a non-compensating differential, the interesting feature of the contract is the use of bonding. This study, while arguing that these early chartered companies did attenuate managerial opportunism, describes a fully functioning bonding market for managers. The paper also argues that the Royal African Company, because of an inappropriate head office structure (one which was imposed on the company in its charter), was unable to develop an internal trust network between subordinate and superior which would have helped further to reduce moral hazard.