Self-Organizing Policy Networks: Risk, Partner Selection, and Cooperation in Estuaries
Self-Organizing Policy Networks: Risk, Partner Selection, and Cooperation in Estuaries
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00451.x
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发表时间：
2010-07-01
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Scholz, John T.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Berardo, Ramiro;Scholz, John T.
政策行动者寻求网络联系，以改善个人的回报，在机构集体行动的困境，地方分散的政策舞台。风险假说认为，当合作涉及低风险时，行为者寻求桥接关系（关系良好，受欢迎的合作伙伴，最大限度地获得信息），但当背叛风险增加时，寻求粘合关系（传递，互惠关系，最大限度地提高信誉）。我们在新发展的政策领域测试这一假设，预计有利于解决低风险困境的关系。一个基于行动者的随机网络演化模型估计1999年和2001年在美国10个河口的调查数据发现，行动者倾向于选择流行的演员作为合作伙伴，这可能会创建一个集中的桥接结构，即使没有任何政府的授权，能够有效的信息传输协调政策。参与者还寻求支持小型联合项目的互惠纽带关系，并迅速了解是否信任他们的合作伙伴。
Policy actors seek network contacts to improve individual payoffs in the institutional collective action dilemmas endemic to fragmented policy arenas. The risk hypothesis argues that actors seek bridging relationships (well-connected, popular partners that maximize their access to information) when cooperation involves low risks, but seek bonding relationships (transitive, reciprocal relationships that maximize credibility) when risks of defection increase. We test this hypothesis in newly developing policy arenas expected to favor relationships that resolve low-risk dilemmas. A stochastic actor-based model for network evolution estimated with survey data from 1999 and 2001 in 10 U.S. estuaries finds that actors do tend to select popular actors as partners, which presumably creates a centralized bridging structure capable of efficient information transmission for coordinating policies even without any government mandate. Actors also seek reciprocal bonding relationships supportive of small joint projects and quickly learn whether or not to trust their partners.