Optimal Temporal Customer Purchasing Decisions Under Trade-In Programs with Up-Front Fees
Optimal Temporal Customer Purchasing Decisions Under Trade-In Programs with Up-Front Fees
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DOI：
10.1111/deci.12081
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发表时间：
2014-06
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Rui Yin;Christopher S. Tang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Rui Yin;Christopher S. Tang
为了吸引客户购买当前和新一代的产品随着时间的推移，许多公司提供不同的贸易在程序，包括程序，要求客户支付预付费。为了检验以旧换新计划的有效性，我们建立了一个两阶段模型，在这个模型中，一个公司在第一阶段销售第一代产品，在第二阶段销售第二代产品;然而，该公司提供了一个以旧换新计划，客户可以在第一阶段购买第一代产品时参加。为了参与，每个客户必须在第一阶段支付不可退还的费用，以便她可以选择以旧换新她的第一代产品，并获得预定的以旧换新价值，用于在第二阶段购买第二代产品。为了捕捉市场的异质性和市场的不确定性，我们研究的情况下，第一代产品的估值不同的客户和第二代产品的估值是不确定的先验。通过分析一个两阶段的博弈，我们确定每个理性的客户的最佳购买行为，我们表明，该公司总是更好地提供自己的贸易在程序。此外，我们的数值分析表明，以旧换新计划可以使公司显着受益，特别是当（i）第一代产品的剩余价值高;（ii）第二代产品的预期增量价值高;或（iii）第二代产品的估值是高度不确定的。
To entice customers to purchase both current and new generation products over time, many firms offer different trade-in programs including programs that require customers to pay an up-front fee. To examine the effectiveness of the trade-in programs, we develop a two-period model in which a firm sells the first generation product in the first period and the second generation product in the second period; however, the firm offers a trade-in program that customers can participate in when purchasing the first generation product in the first period. To participate, each customer has to pay a nonrefundable fee in the first period so that she has the option to trade-in her first generation product and receive a prespecified trade-in value to be used for the purchase of the second generation product in the second period. To capture market heterogeneity and market uncertainty, we examine the case when the valuation of the first generation product varies among customers and the valuation of the second generation product is uncertain a priori. By analyzing a two-period game, we determine the optimal purchasing behavior of each rational customer, and we show that the firm is always better off by offering its own trade-in programs. Also, our numerical analysis reveals that trade-in programs can benefit the firm significantly especially when (i) the residual value of the first generation product is high; (ii) the expected incremental value of the second generation product is high; or (iii) the valuation of the second generation product is highly uncertain.