Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?
Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia?
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1088-4963.2006.00060.x
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发表时间：
2006-03-01
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Sabel, C
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Cohen, J;Sabel, C
在一个相互竞争的国家的世界里，各国人民通过全球化越来越直接地联系在一起，托马斯·内格尔有力地重申了早期现代政治思想的一个经典命题：内格尔认为，在国家之外，没有正义。从这一点来看，鉴于没有一个全球国家，就不可能有全球正义。然而，除了这一引人注目的结论之外，内格尔的论断中几乎没有呼应他所呼吁的早期现代传统的霍布斯变体。内格尔认为，即使在我们全球无国籍的情况下，人道主义道德，包括对基本的、统一的人权的保护，也强加了跨越国界的义务，尽管这些义务没有达到正义的要求。他还承认，专门机构组织的全球形式的合作对世界各地个人的生活日益重要，这是对托马斯·内格尔的答复，《全球正义的问题》，《哲学与公共事务》33(2005)：113-47。我们在正文中放置了对Nagel文章的页面引用。作者感谢Josiah Ober和Denis Feeney为这个标题提供的帮助。我们感谢来自Suzanne Berger、John Ferejohn、Barbara Fry、Robert Keohane、Gerald Neuman、Josiah Ober、Mathias Risse、Debra Satz、Joanne Scott、William Simon、Jonathan Zeitlin以及《哲学与公共事务》编辑的早期草稿。1.Nagel注意到他的结论与Michael Blake的重要文章《分配正义、国家强制和自治》中的结论之间的相似之处，《哲学与公共事务》30(2001)：257-96。但也有很大的哲学差异。虽然布莱克和内格尔一样，认为国家边界对道德要求有很大的影响，特别是，对“相对剥夺”的担忧仅限于共同公民之间的关系，但布莱克认为，国内和全球的政治道德是将自由的自治和“平等主义正义”思想应用到不同的制度环境中的结果。因此，布莱克并不是一个对全球正义持怀疑态度的人，他似乎接受了一种全面的道德自由主义，而不是内格尔支持的那种政治概念。
In a world of rivalrous states whose peoples are connected ever more directly by globalization, Thomas Nagel has forcefully reasserted a clas-sical thesis of early modern political thought: outside the state, Nagel argues, there is no justice.'From this it follows, given the absence of a global state, that there can be no global justice. 2 Apart from this striking conclusion, however, little in Nagel's argu-ment echoes the Hobbesian variant of the early modern tradition to which he appeals. Even in our globally stateless condition, Nagel assumes, a humanitarian morality, including protections of basic, uni-versal human rights, imposes obligations across borders, although these obligations fall short of requirements of justice. He acknowledges, too, the growing importance to the lives of individuals the world over of global forms of cooperation organized by specialized institutions thatA reply to Thomas Nagel," The Problem of Global Justice," Philosophy & Public Affairs 33 (2005): 113-47. We have placed page references to Nagel's article in the text. The authors thank Josiah Ober and Denis Feeney for assistance with the title. We are grateful for com-ments on an earlier draft from Suzanne Berger, John Ferejohn, Barbara Fried, Robert Keohane, Gerald Neuman, Josiah Ober, Mathias Risse, Debra Satz, Joanne Scott, William Simon, Jonathan Zeitlin, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs. 1. Nagel notes the parallels between his conclusions and those in Michael Blake's important article," Distributive Justice, State Coercion and Autonomy," Philosophy & Public Affairs 30 (2001): 257-96. But there are also large philosophical differences. Although Blake, like Nagel, thinks that state boundaries make a large difference to moral requirements, in particular, that concerns about" relative deprivation" are confined to relations between co-citizens, Blake sees domestic and global political moralities as resulting from the application of liberal ideas of autonomy and" egalitarian justice" to different institutional settings. So Blake is not a skeptic about global justice, and appears to embrace a comprehensive moral liberalism rather than the kind of political conception that Nagel endorses.