What Do Theory-of-Mind Tasks Actually Measure? Theory and Practice
What Do Theory-of-Mind Tasks Actually Measure? Theory and Practice
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DOI：
10.1177/1745691619896607
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发表时间：
2020-02-18
影响因子：
12.6
通讯作者：
Rossetti, Yves
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Francois, Quesque;Rossetti, Yves
近几十年来，代表他人精神状态的能力（即，心理理论）在从行为学到认知神经科学的各种学科中获得了特别的关注。尽管人们对社会认知的兴趣呈指数增长，但社会认知的功能结构仍然不清楚。在本综述中，我们认为，不仅是词汇，而且大多数经典的测量心理理论缺乏特异性。我们研究了用于评估心理理论的经典测试，并注意到其中大多数不要求参与者代表另一个人的心理状态，有时甚至不要求参与者代表任何心理状态。我们的回顾表明，许多经典的测试测量较低水平的过程，不直接测试心理理论。我们建议，应更多地关注社会认知领域中使用的方法，以提高对潜在概念的理解。
In recent decades, the ability to represent others' mental states (i.e., theory of mind) has gained particular attention in various disciplines ranging from ethology to cognitive neuroscience. Despite the exponentially growing interest, the functional architecture of social cognition is still unclear. In the present review, we argue that not only the vocabulary but also most of the classic measures for theory of mind lack specificity. We examined classic tests used to assess theory of mind and noted that the majority of them do not require the participant to represent another's mental state or, sometimes, any mental state at all. Our review reveals that numerous classic tests measure lower-level processes that do not directly test for theory of mind. We propose that more attention should be paid to methods used in this field of social cognition to improve the understanding of underlying concepts.