Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach
Litigation and Settlement: An Empirical Approach
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诉讼与和解：实证方法
DOI：
10.2307/1926963
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发表时间：
1989
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Zuehlke
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Fournier;T. Zuehlke
在涉及金钱损失的民事诉讼中，诉讼当事人往往发现庭外和解比审判更可取。大多数和解选择的理论模型采用预期效用最大化框架，强调风险偏好、诉讼成本和审判裁决分配的重要性。一个实证模型的结算选择是用来检查是否突出的变量在理论文献中的统计学上有用的解释的发生和货币价值的结算。从民事档案样本中得出的估计为法律的制度如何影响诉讼当事人在和解过程中的行为提供了新的经验证据。版权所有1989年由麻省理工学院出版社。
Litigants in civil lawsuits involving monetary damages often find an out-of-court settlement preferable to a trial. Most theoretical models of settlement choice employ an expected-utility-maximizing framework that emphasizes the importance of risk preferences, litigation costs, and the distribution of trial awards. An empirical model of settlement choice is used to examine whether the variables prominent in the theoretical literature are statistically useful in explaining the occurrence and monetary value of settlements. Estimates from a sample of civil filings provide new empirical evidence of how the legal system affects the behavior of litigants during the settlement process. Copyright 1989 by MIT Press.