Equity, efficiency, uncertainty, and the mitigation of global climate change
Equity, efficiency, uncertainty, and the mitigation of global climate change
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DOI：
10.1111/0272-4332.206078
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发表时间：
2000-12-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
Harvey, CM
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hammitt, JK;Harvey, CM
旨在减轻全球气候变化潜在损害的政策使当代人付出代价，而为后代造福。本文探讨了三个程式化的政策之间的比较照常营业，缓解气候变化和气候损害的补偿取决于社会偏好的风险和跨期公平。还审查了机会成本标准，该标准认为，如果缓解措施的净现值小于“一切照旧”的净现值，则不应选择缓解措施。分析表明，用于评估缓解是否满足这一标准的贴现因子取决于偏好的风险和消费的跨期不平等，以及补偿政策的风险。风险厌恶倾向于缓解，而不是一切照旧。如果社会对不平等是中性的，那么风险厌恶倾向于补偿，但如果社会是不平等厌恶的，那么风险厌恶对补偿和一切照旧之间偏好的影响是模糊的。不平等厌恶倾向于支持一切照旧，而不是两种替代政策，前提是，粗略地说，预期的未来福利改善超过预期的气候损害。
Policies to mitigate potential damages from global climate change impose costs on the current generation to provide benefits to future generations. This article examines how comparisons among three stylized policies-business-as-usual, mitigation of climate change, and compensation for climate damages-depend on social preferences with respect to risk and intertemporal equity. Also examined is the opportunity-cost criterion, which asserts that mitigation should not be chosen if its net present value is smaller than that of business-as-usual. Analysis reveals that the discount factor used to evaluate whether mitigation satisfies this criterion depends on preferences regarding risk and intertemporal inequality of consumption, and on the risk of the compensation policy. Risk aversion favors mitigation over business-as-usual. If society is neutral to inequality, risk aversion disfavors compensation, but if society is inequality averse, the effect of risk aversion on preferences between compensation and business-as-usual is ambiguous. Inequality aversion tends to favor business-as-usual over both alternative policies provided that, roughly speaking, the anticipated future improvements in welfare exceed the anticipated climate damages.