Thinking in a foreign language distorts allocation of cognitive effort: Evidence from reasoning
Thinking in a foreign language distorts allocation of cognitive effort: Evidence from reasoning
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DOI：
10.1016/j.cognition.2020.104420
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发表时间：
2020-12-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
Pienkosz, Damian
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bialek, Michal;Muda, Rafal;Pienkosz, Damian
双语者，在他们的外语中，免于一些决策偏见。我们在逻辑推理的背景下考察了这种“外语效应”，在这种背景下，推理者被要求跟踪三段论的逻辑状态，而忽略其可信度。在三个实验中，我们发现了相反的外语效应：外语推理者对三段论逻辑结构的评价能力较低，但对其可信度的偏见并没有减少。在推理任务中取得成功的一条途径是始终参与反思性处理。一个更有效的策略是元认知地跟踪基于信念的直觉是否与基于逻辑的直觉冲突，并且只在这种冲突存在时进行反射。我们提供的证据表明，外语推理是不太准确，因为他们努力检测信念逻辑冲突，反过来又不能从事反射处理时，必要的推翻不正确的，直观的反应。我们建议，外语推理机是不太能够检测到信仰逻辑冲突，无论是由于削弱直觉或由于一个更保守的阈值之间的冲突检测多个竞争的直觉。
Bilinguals, in their foreign language, are spared from several decision-making biases. We examined this "Foreign Language Effect" in the context of logical reasoning, in which reasoners are required to track the logical status of a syllogism, ignoring its believability. Across three experiments, we found the reverse Foreign Language Effect; foreign language reasoners are less able to evaluate the logical structure of syllogisms, but no less biased by their believability. One path to succeeding in reasoning tasks is always engaging in reflective processing. A more efficient strategy is metacognitively tracking whether belief-based intuitions conflict with logic-based intuitions and only reflecting when such conflict is present. We provide evidence that foreign language reasoners are less accurate because they struggle to detect belief-logic conflict, and in turn fail to engage in reflective processing when necessary to override the incorrect, intuitive response. We propose that foreign language reasoners are less able to detect belief-logic conflict either due to weakened intuitions or due to a more conservative threshold for the detection of conflict between multiple competing intuitions.