Epistemic rationality: Skepticism toward unfounded beliefs requires sufficient cognitive ability and motivation to be rational
Epistemic rationality: Skepticism toward unfounded beliefs requires sufficient cognitive ability and motivation to be rational
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DOI：
10.1016/j.paid.2017.10.026
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发表时间：
2018-02-01
影响因子：
4.3
通讯作者：
van Prooijen, Jan-Willem
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Stahl, Tomas;van Prooijen, Jan-Willem
为什么对超自然现象、阴谋论和其他各种没有证据支持的现象的信仰在现代社会仍然广泛存在？在本研究中，我们采用了个体差异的方法，因为我们试图确定对毫无根据的信念怀疑的心理前兆。我们认为，毫无根据的信念之所以如此普遍，部分原因是怀疑主义既需要足够的分析技能，也需要在理性基础上形成信念的动机。在研究1中，我们发现，分析性思维与较低的倾向相信各种阴谋论，和超自然现象，但只有在个人谁强烈重视认识理性。在研究2中，我们复制了这种对超自然信念的影响，但没有复制阴谋信念。我们还提供的证据表明，一般的认知能力，而不是分析认知风格，是分析思维的基本方面，负责这些影响。
Why does belief in the paranormal, conspiracy theories, and various other phenomena that are not backed up by evidence remain widespread in modern society? In the present research we adopt an individual difference approach, as we seek to identify psychological precursors of skepticism toward unfounded beliefs. We propose that part of the reason why unfounded beliefs are so widespread is because skepticism requires both sufficient analytic skills, and the motivation to form beliefs on rational grounds. In Study 1 we show that analytic thinking is associated with a lower inclination to believe various conspiracy theories, and paranormal phenomena, but only among individuals who strongly value epistemic rationality. We replicate this effect on paranormal belief, but not conspiracy beliefs, in Study 2. We also provide evidence suggesting that general cognitive ability, rather than analytic cognitive style, is the underlying facet of analytic thinking that is responsible for these effects.