What Information Do We Use in Social Dilemmas? Environmental Uncertainty and the Employment of Coordination Rules
What Information Do We Use in Social Dilemmas? Environmental Uncertainty and the Employment of Coordination Rules
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我们在社交困境中使用哪些信息？
DOI：
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Linda Metman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Dijk;H. Wilke;M. Wilke;Linda Metman
以往的研究表明，在社会两难情境中，群体成员基于公平的考虑，会默契地协调他们的选择行为。在分析了实施此类协调规则所需的信息后，提出了一个框架来预测环境不确定性对社会困境的影响。预测进行了测试，在两个实验上不对称的公共品困境和资源困境。这两个实验的结果表明，当默契协调选择行为，群体成员倾向于完全依赖于环境信息，他们是肯定的。更具体地说，研究结果表明，环境不确定性的影响取决于困境类型，类型的不对称性，和类型的不确定性群体成员所面临的。
Previous research suggests that in social dilemma situations, group members tacitly coordinate their choice behavior on the basis of fairness considerations. After an analysis of the information needed to implement such coordination rules, a framework is presented to predict effects of environmental uncertainty in social dilemmas. Predictions were tested in two experiments on asymmetric Public Good dilemmas and Resource dilemmas. Results of both experiments indicate that when tacitly coordinating choice behavior, group members tend to rely solely on the environmental information they are certain about. More specifically, the results indicate that effects of environmental uncertainty are dependent on the dilemma type, the type of asymmetry, and the type of uncertainty group members are facing.