Truthful auction for cooperative communications with revenue maximization
Truthful auction for cooperative communications with revenue maximization
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DOI：
10.1109/icc.2012.6363632
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发表时间：
2012-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Dejun Yang;Xi Fang;G. Xue
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dejun Yang;Xi Fang;G. Xue
拍卖理论已经被应用于协作通信以有效地分配资源或激励无线设备参与协作通信。然而，现有研究的一个共同缺点是忽视了创收。创收是商业网络的最终目标，例如，WiMAX网络。在本文中，我们研究了如何使用拍卖机制来分配中继节点和向源节点收费的问题，使得卖方的收入，例如，基站被最大化。我们首先提出了一个基于VCG的拍卖机制，它可以最大化的收入，同时加强真实性。为了克服基于VCG的拍卖机制的高时间复杂度，我们进一步设计了另一种低时间复杂度的真实拍卖机制。实验结果表明，次优拍卖机制在不严重牺牲收益的情况下，显著降低了时间复杂度。
Auction theory has been applied to cooperative communications to either efficiently allocate resources or incentivize wireless devices to participate in cooperative communications. However, a common shortcoming of the existing studies is that the revenue generation is neglected. Revenue generation is the ultimate goal of commercial networks, e.g., WiMAX networks. In this paper, we study the problem of how to use auction mechanisms to allocate the relay nodes and charge the source nodes, such that the revenue of the seller, e.g., the base station, is maximized. We first propose a VCG-based auction mechanism, which can maximize the revenue while enforcing the truthfulness. To overcome the high time complexity of the VCG-based auction mechanism, we further design another truthful auction mechanism with low time complexity. Experiment results show that the suboptimal auction mechanism significantly reduces the time complexity without severely sacrificing the revenue.