Endogenous State Weakness: Paramilitaries and Electoral Politics in Rio de Janeiro

Endogenous State Weakness: Paramilitaries and Electoral Politics in Rio de Janeiro
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内生的国家弱点:里约热内卢的准军事组织和选举政治

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发表时间:
2014
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通讯作者:
Benjamin Lessing
Benjamin Lessing
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作者:
F. D. Hidalgo;Benjamin Lessing

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国家的软弱可以自我强化,鼓励叛乱或犯罪集团直接挑战国家权力,产生正面冲突,进一步削弱国家。对于准军事组织非革命的亲政府团体,通常与国家力量有着非正式的联系,削弱国家力量的方式更多的是通过间接的渠道,包括选举政治,而不是直接的冲突。我们通过对里约热内卢警方相关民兵组织的分析来说明这一点。民兵组织曾经是少数几个贫民窟独有的,在那里他们阻止了城市强大的毒品集团,在2003年至2007年期间迅速扩散,控制了大约170个社区。2006年,民兵领导人和同情警察的候选人当选,这使人们猜测民兵的武装胁迫实际上把被统治的社区变成了选举区。我们通过对1998年、2002年和2006年选举结果的差异分析来检验这一假设,利用军事扩张的时间来估计统治对投票行为的影响。控制潜在的混杂因素与邻里水平的面板数据集,我们发现,militariarule的警察附属候选人的选票份额显着增加。然后,我们提供的证据表明,民兵如何利用政治权力来削弱国家的努力,以减少他们的活动。马萨诸塞州政治学系助理教授。芝加哥大学政治学系助理教授。
State weakness can be self-reinforcing, encouraging rebel or criminal groups to directly challenge state power, generating frontal conflicts that can further weaken the state. With paramilitaries—non-revolutionary, pro-government groups, often with informal ties to state forces—state-weakening occurs less through outright conflict than more oblique channels, including electoral politics. We show this through an analysis of Rio de Janeiro’s police-linked milı́cia groups. Once unique to a handful of favelas (slums), where they kept out the city’s powerful drug syndicates, milı́cias rapidly proliferated between 2003 and 2007 to control some 170 communities. The election of milı́cia leaders and sympathetic police-related candidates in 2006 led to speculation that armed coercion by milı́cias had effectively transformed dominated communities into electoral bailiwicks. We test this hypothesis through a difference-in-difference analysis of election results from 1998, 2002, and 2006, exploiting the timing of milı́cia expansion to estimate the impact of domination on voting behavior. Controlling for potential confounders with a neighborhood-level panel data set, we find that milı́cia rule causes the vote shares of police-affiliated candidates to increase dramatically. We then provide evidence of how milı́cias used political power to weaken state efforts to curtail their activities. ∗Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. †Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago.