Second-Best Climate Agreements and Technology Policy
Second-Best Climate Agreements and Technology Policy
复制标题
第二好的气候协议和技术政策
DOI：
10.2202/1538-0637.1472
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Hoel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Golombek;M. Hoel
摘要我们研究了次优气候协议中存在的技术溢出在国家内部和国家之间，在每个国家内的技术外部性是通过国内补贴的R&D投资得到纠正。我们比较了两种类型的国际气候协定的性质时，国家间的R&D的外部性不通过气候协定的规定。在排放配额的国际协议下，均衡R&D补贴低于社会最优补贴。如果气候协议规定所有国家都应征收共同的碳税，那么均衡补贴甚至会更低。在配额协议下，总配额应设定得足够低，以使碳价格超过庇古水平，而在税收协议下，情况可能正好相反。我们还表明，社会成本高于第二最好的税收协议下比第二最好的配额协议。
Abstract We study second-best climate agreements in the presence of technology spillovers within and across countries, where the technology externalities within each country are corrected through a domestic subsidy of R&D investments. We compare the properties of two types of international climate agreements when the inter-country externalities from R&D are not regulated through the climate agreement. With an international agreement on emission quotas, the equilibrium R&D subsidy is lower than the socially optimal subsidy. The equilibrium subsidy is even lower if the climate agreement instead dictates that a common carbon tax should be imposed in all countries. Under a quota agreement, total quotas should be set low enough for the price of carbon to exceed the Pigovian level, whereas the opposite may be true under a tax agreement. We also show that social costs are higher under a second-best tax agreement than under a second-best quota agreement.