Optimal Team Contracts
Optimal Team Contracts
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最佳团队合同
DOI：
10.2307/136345
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ed Nosal
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Andolfatto;Ed Nosal
在本文中，作者评估了Mukesh Eswaran和Ashok Kotwal（1984）和Eric Rasmusen（1987）对Bengt Holmstrom（1982）提出的团队道德风险问题解决方案的合法性提出的某些挑战。他们表明，Rasmusen提出的论点取决于一些相当极端的条件，这些条件涉及与重新谈判尝试有关的个人行为的可验证性;放松这些条件会使有效的不确定性平衡合同变得不可行，正如Holmstrom所指出的那样。其次，作者证明埃斯瓦兰和科特瓦尔提出的批评是无效的，至少如果人们坚持认为秘密交易必须满足霍尔姆斯特罗姆提出的委托代理合同所要求的相同的激励相容条件的话。
In this paper, the authors evaluate certain challenges put forth by Mukesh Eswaran and Ashok Kotwal (1984) and Eric Rasmusen (1987) concerning the legitimacy of Bengt Holmstrom's (1982) proposed solution for the problem of moral hazard in teams. They demonstrate that the argument put forth by Rasmusen hinges on some rather extreme conditions concerning the verifiability of individual actions relating to renegotiation attempts; relaxing these conditions renders efficient budget-balancing contracts infeasible, as argued by Holmstrom. Second, the authors demonstrate that the criticism put forth by Eswaran and Kotwal is invalid, at least if one insists that clandestine deals must satisfy the same incentive-compatibility conditions required of the principal-agent contract proposed by Holmstrom.