Communist party direct control and corporate investment efficiency: evidence from China*
Communist party direct control and corporate investment efficiency: evidence from China*
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DOI：
10.1080/16081625.2018.1470541
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发表时间：
2020-03
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Xiaorong Li;Kam C. Chan;Hai-long Ma
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xiaorong Li;Kam C. Chan;Hai-long Ma
以中国为代表的许多社会主义国家在经济发展过程中，都十分重视固定资产投资。政府通过共产党（CPC）利用国有企业（SOEs）推动这项政策。政治和代理成本使国有企业投资次优。本文以中国国有企业为样本，考察了企业层面的CPC控制对投资效率的影响。我们测试机构问题检修和政治防御假说。研究结果表明，中国共产党的控制，在有一个中国共产党成员作为董事，监事，或高级管理人员，可以提高投资效率，特别是在国有企业的过度投资。我们的研究结果对不同的过度投资措施都是稳健的，在地方控制的国有企业和具有CEO/董事长双重身份的国有企业中更为明显。总体而言，我们的研究结果支持代理问题大修假说。平均而言，一名中国共产党成员参与对一家国有企业的控制，减少了代理成本，抵消了额外的政治成本。
Abstract Many communist countries, such as China, place emphasis on fixed-asset investments in their process of economic development. Governments push the policy using state-owned enterprises (SOEs) via a communist party committee (CPC). Political and agency costs make SOE investment sub-optimal. We examine the impact of firm-level CPC control on the investment efficiency among a sample of Chinese SOEs. We test agency problem overhaul and political entrenchment hypotheses. The results suggest that CPC control, in terms of having a CPC member as a director, supervisor, or senior executive, can improve investment efficiency, especially for overinvestment in SOEs. Our findings are robust to different measures of overinvestment and are more pronounced among locally controlled SOEs and SOEs with CEO/board chairman duality. Overall, our findings support the agency problem overhaul hypothesis. The involvement of a CPC member in the control of an SOE, on average, mitigates the agency cost and more than offsets the additional political cost incurred.