What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality

What makes human cognition unique? From individual to shared to collective intentionality
复制标题

DOI:
10.1111/1468-0017.00217
复制
发表时间:
2003-04-01
期刊:
影响因子:
2
通讯作者:
Rakoczy, H
Rakoczy, H
中科院分区:
心理学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Tomasello, M;Rakoczy, H

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

人们普遍认为,人类的社会认知与其他动物的社会认知的区别在于四岁儿童和成人的信念-欲望心理(即所谓的心理理论)。我们在这里认为,这实际上是人类独特的社会认知的第二个个体发育步骤。第一步是一岁的儿童理解的人作为意向代理人,这使得文化学习和共享意向的技能。这一初始步骤是“真实的事物”,在这个意义上,它使幼儿能够参与文化活动,使用共享的,透视符号与传统/规范/反思的维度,例如,语言交流和假装游戏,从而开创了儿童对事物的理解心理。在四岁时理解信念和参与集体意向性,使人们能够理解诸如金钱和婚姻等事物,这是由于几年来与其他人在视角转换和反思话语中的参与,其中包含命题态度结构。
It is widely believed that what distinguishes the social cognition of humans from that of other animals is the belief-desire psychology of four-year-old children and adults (so-called theory of mind). We argue here that this is actually the second ontogenetic step in uniquely human social cognition. The first step is one year old children's understanding of persons as intentional agents, which enables skills of cultural learning and shared intentionality. This initial step is 'the real thing' in the sense that it enables young children to participate in cultural activities using shared, perspectival symbols with a conventional/normative/reflective dimension-for example, linguistic communication and pretend play-thus inaugurating children's understanding of things mental. Understanding beliefs and participating in collective intentionality at four years of age-enabling the comprehension of such things as money and marriage-results from several years of engagement with other persons in perspective-shifting and reflective discourse containing propositional attitude constructions.